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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to aid the military
communicator in understanding the phenomenon that is known as
the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . This thesis includes a brief
history and definition of the EMP and a description of the
various EMP environments. It also discusses the effects that
an EMP can have on exposed electronic components and
communications equipment. It provides a description of the
major approaches that are used to reduce the harmful effects
of an EMP. A discussion of the factors considered in a
cost/benefit analysis is included for the purpose of
establishing cost and benefit considerations relevant to a
system's evaluation. The thesis concludes that the decision
of whether or not to protect electronic and communications
equipment from an EMP depends on many factors, including the
criticality of the equipment's mission and the cost of EMP
hardening compared to the benefits received. It also
concludes that the nation should maintain its EMP hardening
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On August 6, 194 5, the world was thrust into the atomic
age with the detonation of the first atomic bomb over the
Japanese city of Hiroshima. While the bomb's designers were
relatively certain of the effect that it would have in terms
of blast, heat and radiation, they were less certain of the
effect it would have in terms of an electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) . Although the weapon's designers predicted that an EMP
would be created at the moment of detonation, no effort was
made to record the EMP ' s effects or the damage that it may
have caused to the electrical equipment and electronic
components within Hiroshima. Therefore, the scientists did
not have any proof as to the existence of the suspected
electromagnetic pulse.
It was a peaceful July evening in 1962 on the Hawaiian
Island of Oahu. Suddenly, on the horizon there was a greenish
white flash and the sky was described as turning pink, then
orange, then red, and the heavens were filled with a ghastly
light. Unknown to the islanders, at precisely that time, the
United States had detonated an atomic device 248 miles above
the small Pacific atoll known as Johnston Island, 800 miles
southwest of Hawaii. Approximately one second after the
blast, the Hawaiian Islands began to experience severe
problems with electronic failures. Burglar alarms started to
ring, street lights blacked out, fuses blew, circuit breakers
tripped, and power lines went dead. Finally, almost seventeen
years after the detonation over Hiroshima, scientists had the
evidence they needed to prove the existence of the
electromagnetic pulse. [Ref. 1: p. 41]
Unfortunately for science, the "Limited Test Ban Treaty"
of 1963, which prohibited the above ground testing of nuclear
weapons, served to eliminate the possibility for further high
altitude nuclear burst EMP testing. All future EMP
information would be compiled through the use of subsurface
nuclear tests, analysis of existing atmospheric test data,
theoretical calculations, and non-nuclear simulations. [Ref.
2: p. 139]
B. PURPOSE
The intended purpose of this thesis is to develop a
document which may be used by nontechnical communications
personnel in their effort to gain an insight and understanding
of the phenomena called electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . Further,
the reader will discover how EMP can effect electronic
components and electrical and communications eguipment. This
thesis will provide the communicator with information that can
be used in the development of a plan to minimize the harmful
effects of EMP.
Specific areas of discussion include the generation of
EMP, the various types of EMP and their effects on
communications equipment, and how to reduce the harmful
effects that EMP may cause to unprotected communications and
electronic equipment. The scope of this thesis is
intentionally broad and specifically nontechnical in nature in
an effort to offer a general introduction to the important
issues pertaining to EMP. It is written for consumption by
those who may be involved in communications systems operation,
safety and security but who do not have an engineering
background.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis is designed to provide the reader with no
previous knowledge concerning the electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
a general discussion of what the EMP is and how it effects
electronic and communications equipment. Chapter II will
discuss how an EMP is generated and the various EMP
environments. Chapter III discusses EMP coupling and EMP
effects on electronic equipment and cables. It also describes
the concept of radio blackout. Chapter IV defines EMP
hardening and presents ways to reduce the EMP environment and
raise system threshold. The chapter then discusses factors to
consider when selecting a hardening approach and system
testing. Chapter V presents an approach to estimating EMP
hardening costs for both tactical and stationary systems. It
then describes life cycle cost considerations, the benefits of
EMP hardening and discusses two cost/benefit analysis models.
The thesis concludes with Chapter VI which presents the
summary and conclusions.
II. THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
A. INTRODUCTION
The detonation of a nuclear device is usually thought to
produce three destructive environments: blast, thermal
radiation and nuclear radiation. As illustrated in Figure 1,
at least one additional destructive environment is also
produced [Ref. 3: p. 3]. The fourth environment does not
destroy people, equipment, and buildings with devastating
shock waves, searing heat, or deadly radiation; rather, it
causes damage or destruction through the sudden release of a
high intensity burst of energy in the radio and microwave
frequency spectrum. This sudden burst of energy is called the
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . Because the EMP is received in
an extremely short period of time, intense currents are
produced which are known to degrade or damage the sensitive
circuits and components within electronic and electrical
equipment and communications systems.
B. EMP GENERATION
The generation of an electromagnetic pulse is actually a
two-step process which begins with the detonation of a nuclear
device. The first step is the creation of a sudden burst of
high-energy photons which are produced by the nuclear








Figure 1. Nuclear Detonation Environments
rays and x-rays. Prompt gamma rays are produced during
fission, when the nucleus of an atom splits into nuclei of
lighter atoms and is accompanied by the release of energy, and
by neutron interactions with the nuclear device's materials.
The prompt gamma rays are so named because they have an
extremely short rise time, about ten nanoseconds from
detonation, and a very short duration, less than 0.1
microseconds. For reference, ten nanoseconds eguals ten
billionths of one second, and 0.1 microseconds eguals one ten
millionth of one second. X-rays are emitted somewhat later
and are of lower energy but are about 1000 times more numerous
than the prompt gamma rays.
The second step in the generation of an EMP is the
production of moving charged particles. As seen in Figure 2,
when the charged particles are generated in the atmosphere,
the dominant production process results from Compton
scattering of the prompt gamma rays [Ref. 4: p. 5]. This
occurs when the gamma rays collide with electrons present in
the air molecules. The collisions release a low energy
secondary photon and an electron, and leave behind a positive
ion. The free electron has almost the same direction and
speed as the original gamma ray and is referred to as a
Compton electron after the discoverer of this effect, Arthur
H. Compton.
The negatively charged electrons produced by the Compton
scattering move away from the center of the burst at a much
faster rate than do the positively charged ions. The initial
result is a separation of charges with the region closer to
the center of the burst having a net positive charge and the
region farther away having a net negative charge. This
separation of charges produces an electric field. The fast
moving Compton electrons represent an electric current. In
addition, the high energy Compton electrons produce secondary
electrons in the atmosphere. These secondary electrons
together with the Compton electrons and the electric field
produced by the charge separation of the electrons and ions
act like an antenna system that launches a propagating
electromagnetic wave of high intensity. This effect









Figure 2. Creation of an Electromagnetic Pulse
C. EMP ENVIRONMENTS
Figure 3 shows the four possible scenarios for the
detonation of a nuclear device which lead to the creation of
an EMP environment [Ref. 6: p. 19]. The first environment is
generated by a nuclear burst below the earth's surface. The
second environment results from a surface burst, and includes
detonations up to a height of approximately two kilometers
(km) . An air burst in the near atmosphere, roughly between
two and 20 km produces the third EMP environment; and a high
altitude burst in the earth's upper atmosphere, generally
defined as above 30 km, results in the fourth environment.
[Ref. 6: pp. 20-32] The various EMP environments will now be
discussed.
High Altitude EMP














Figure 3. EMP Environments
1. subsurface Burst EMP
As with all nuclear bursts, an EMP results from
subsurface and underwater detonations. However, in both of
these cases, due to the density of the surrounding material
the prompt gamma rays produced by the blast do not propagate
very far, and the Compton electrons distribute their energy
very rapidly. This leads to an absence of the extensive
strong current systems that produce an EMP. As a result, the
EMP is very weak and equipment that is close enough to be
impacted by the detonation is destroyed or damaged by the
weapon's shocking blast and searing heat, and EMP is not a
consideration. [Ref. 5: p. 61]
2. Surface Burst EMP
Surface burst EMP is produced through the detonation
of a nuclear device on or within 2 km of the earth's surface.
It is created when the prompt gamma rays which are released by
the nuclear explosion and the atoms within the earth's
atmosphere collide to produce a current flow of scattered
electrons. The negatively charged electrons move outward from
the center of the detonation and leave the positively charged
ions behind. The free electron flow stimulates the
surrounding area to produce a strong electric field. The
ground is a relatively good conductor of electricity and it
provides a path through which the electrons return to the
burst point. This flow of electric current generates a strong
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magnetic field in the area of the detonation. [Ref. 5: pp.
517-518] Both fields are characterized by a short rise time
to peak strength, on the order of a few nanoseconds, and the
electric field peaks at about 100,000 volts per meter (100
kV/m) but may reach values approaching 1,000 kV/m. [Ref. 4: p.
28] Figure 4 illustrates that the damaging effects of the
explosion can directly impact an area from 3 to 5 km from
ground zero depending on the yield of the weapon and its
height above the surface at the time of detonation. This area
is referred to as the "source region." [Ref. 6: p. 31]
A "radiated region" may extend beyond 10 km. The
atmospheric asymmetry which is present between the air and the
earth results in the creation of a vertical electric field
within this area. In the radiated region the EMP may be
significant, but its impact rapidly diminishes with increasing
distance from the burst site. [Ref. 4: p. 32]
Most of the energy for surface burst EMP is centered
below 1,000,000 Hz (1 MHz) in the radiofrequency spectrum.
Electronic and communications equipment within the source
region will be subject to damage and possible destruction from
the nuclear device's blast, heat, and radiation effects as
well as those of the EMP. Equipment in the radiated region
will be impacted more by the influence of EMP and less by the
device's more physically damaging effects. [Ref. 6: p. 30]
Communicators should note that the vertically oriented
electric field present in the radiated region will have a
11
stronger influence on vertical structures such as
communications antennas.
SURFACE BURST EMP





FIELDS EXTEND OUT TO
MORE THAN 10 km
Figure 4. Surface Burst EMP
3. Air Burst EMP
Air burst EMP is produced by nuclear detonations at
altitudes of between 2 and 20 km above the earth's surface.
The source region is similar to that of the surface burst, and
the region's size will depend on weapon yield and height of
burst. Within the source region, prompt gamma rays produced
by the explosion collide with atoms in the air to generate a
current flow of scattered electrons. Positive ions remain
behind at the burst site as the negative electrons move away
from the burst. This separation of ions and electrons
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produces an electric field. Unlike the surface burst, there
is not a return path for the electrons to follow through the
ground, and a magnetic field is not generated.
In the radiated region, the existence of asymmetry in
the atmosphere may work to propagate the electric field which
has been created by the blast. This results when asymmetries
in the atmospheric density gradients permit the ions and
electrons to become further separated through the different
atmospheric layers, and a vertical electric dipole radiation
field is produced. Further atmospheric asymmetry results from
water vapor densities which vary with season and height.
Although these asymmetries may combine, the peak electric
field strength in this region is only about 300 volts per
meter (v/m) at a distance of approximately 5 km from the
center of the burst. Rise time to peak electric field
strength averages between 1 and 5 microseconds. [Ref. 4: pp.
38-43]
Electronic and communications equipment located within
the source region of an air burst, generally airborne systems,
will be subjected to strong EMP as well as shock, heat, and
radiation. In the radiated region, equipment will encounter
a weaker EMP which will decrease with increasing distance from
the center of the blast. As with the surface burst, the
vertical orientation of the electric field makes vertical
structures such as antenna towers particularly susceptible to
the harmful effects of the EMP.
13
4. High Altitude Burst EMP
A nuclear burst which occurs in the presence of very
little atmosphere, above 30 km, is considered a high altitude
detonation. The EMP produced on the earth's surface and in
the atmosphere is referred to as high altitude EMP (HEMP)
.
As the prompt gamma rays travel in a downward
direction from the center of the detonation, they encounter an
increasing number of atoms within the atmosphere. The gamma
rays interact with the atoms to produce the Compton electrons
previously discussed. The free electrons hurtling toward the
surface are deflected by the earth's magnetic field and are
forced into a turning motion about the earth's magnetic field
lines. This turning motion of electrons results in a
significant and widely distributed current which is horizontal
to the earth's surface. This current acts like a large area
antenna that radiates in the direction of the earth's surface.
Because the HEMP rises to its peak electric field strength in
a few nanoseconds and then decreases in a few tens of
nanoseconds, the frequency spectrum reaches from hundreds of
MHz to kHz. The value of the electric field strength received
on the earth's surface is on the order of 10 kV/m to 50 kV/m.
What makes high altitude burst EMP a greater threat
than other EMP environments is the fact that while the
radiated electric field strength of the surface burst drops
off rapidly with distance, the strength of the high altitude
burst remains relatively constant throughout the source
14
region. This significantly increases the area if influence of
the source region and the area in which electrical and
communications equipment may be damaged or destroyed by the
HEMP. As shown in Figure 5, because the HEMP travels at the
speed of light, a single detonation at a height of 500 km
above northeastern Kansas could affect the entire continental





Figure 5. High Altitude EMP Ground Coverage
Although unprotected electrical equipment and
electronic components may be effected by the HEMP, if the
blast occurred during daylight, people on the ground would
probably not know that a nuclear device had been detonated.
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As shown in Figure 6, the source region which this
type of burst generates is circular in nature and roughly 80
km thick at the center. It tapers off to approximately 4 km
at the edges of the region. The source region may extend for
great distances depending on the height of the burst and the
magnitude of the weapon. It will generally extend
horizontally to points tangent to the earth's surface at the
horizon [Ref. 5: pp. 518-520].
HEMP is the threat most commonly specified when
designing systems for EMP protection. The communicator must
be aware of the impact which this type of EMP may have on the
communications system, electrical equipment, and electronic
components. Chapter IV discusses the defensive measures that
can be taken to minimize the harmful effects of HEMP.
5. Magnetohydrodynamic EMP
Magnetohydrodynamic EMP (MHD-EMP) is really a product
of the high altitude nuclear burst; however, it is discussed
separately due to its characteristics and the effects which it
has on electronic and communications equipment that are
different from HEMP. The name is a result of the processes
that make up this particular form of EMP. Through
magnetohydrodynamic processes, the explosion of a nuclear
weapon produces slow variations in the earth's geomagnetic
field. These variations induce circling currents which result











HORIZON FROM BURST POINT
(TANGENT POINT)
Figure 6. HEMP Source Region
later than HEMP. It arrives in two phases which are referred
to as the "early phase," from 1 to 10 seconds after the
detonation, and the "late phase," from 10 to 1000 seconds.
The MHD-EMP fields are characterized by very low
frequency, low peak amplitudes on the order of 3 to 30 volts
per kilometer, and very large areas of coverage in the range
of several hundred kilometers. All MHD-EMP characteristics
will vary depending on weapon yield and burst height. The
communicator should be aware of MHD-EMP because its electric
fields pose a threat to very long land lines such as telephone
lines, extremely low frequency (ELF) networks, and power
distribution systems. [Ref. 4: pp. 20-24]
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6. Transient Radiation Effects In Electronics
Transient radiation effects in electronics (TREE) are
not an EMP and are not considered in the HEMP environment.
However, it is included in this section because TREE damage
can occur in conjunction with EMP and system generated EMP
(SGEMP) , which will be discussed in the next section, if the
electrical equipment and electronic components are located in
the vicinity of an air or surface detonated nuclear explosion.
If the prompt gamma rays produced by the nuclear explosion
interact directly with components of electrical systems, the
resulting damage mechanisms are called TREE, and the dominant
process is the production of the moving charged particles
which are referred to as the photoelectric effect. This
occurs when the prompt gamma rays collide directly with the
atoms in the electronic components. This differs from Compton
scattering in that although a negative electron is released
and a positive ion is left behind, the released electron does
not have the strong forward direction as in the Compton
collision. Rather, the electron energy is rapidly transferred
to other electrons in the material which leads to damage of
the sensitive electronic components within the system. [Ref.
7: p. 2-16]
7. System Generated EMP
System generated EMP (SGEMP) differs from other forms
of EMP in that it interacts directly with electronic and
18
communications systems. The various forms of EMP previously
discussed produce their radiated electric fields through gamma
rays colliding with atoms present in the earth's atmosphere.
These collisions produce the familiar Compton electrons or
photoelectric effect which result in an electric field. The
SGEMP 's electric field is produced when the gamma rays and x-
rays collide directly with the system itself. Obviously,
SGEMP is associated with high altitude nuclear bursts where
the gamma rays and x-rays can interact with the system before
they are absorbed by the atmosphere. Systems in low earth
orbit and close proximity to the weapon at the time of
detonation would be subjected to all of the device's damaging
effects, and the system would only be affected by SGEMP if it
were hardened to withstand the explosion. [Ref . 6: pp. 34-37]
Where the effects of SGEMP are of particular
importance is for those systems outside of the earth's
atmosphere such as satellites and reentry vehicles. The
electronic components and shielding of these systems release
electrons when struck by the gamma rays and x-rays. These
electrons, once freed, continue to travel through the system
where they interact with the internal electronics to cause
damage or destruction through induced electric currents. In
the near vacuum of space, the electric fields can achieve
values on the scale of 100,000 to one million volts per meter.
[Ref 6: pp. 521-522]
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Communicators using space-based satellites for
communications links and/or retransmission must be aware of
the damage which SGEMP can cause to those systems. Plans
should be developed to use alternate communications routes if
the threat of a high altitude nuclear burst exists. High
freguency (HF) radio links and airborne retransmission are
possible alternatives if communications satellites are damaged
or destroyed.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to provide the reader with a
basic understanding of what the electromagnetic pulse is, how
it is generated, and the various types of environments in
which the EMP may be found. The next chapter will describe
the harmful effects which the EMP can have on the sensitive
circuits and components found in electronic and electrical
eguipment and communications systems.
20
III. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EFFECTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The focus of Chapter II is to aid the reader in
identifying the causes of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and
to familiarize him/her with the environments in which the EMP
will be found. This chapter will discuss how the EMP enters
the equipment and what effects it has on the communications
system and the electrical equipment and electronic components
that make up the system. The emphasis of this chapter is on
the effects that a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)
can have on the electrical components and communications
equipment. The reader is reminded that HEMP is the EMP
environment that presents the greatest threat to the
communications system.
Recall from Chapter II that HEMP results in the production
of radiated electromagnetic fields. These fields reach
amplitudes on the order of tens of thousands of volts per
meter and induce transient currents and voltages into the
sensitive electronic components found in electrical and
communications equipment. Transient currents and voltages are
those which have a very short duration and pass away very
quickly. The process by which these transients are induced
21
into the equipment is referred to as coupling and will be
discussed in the following section. [Ref 6: p. 46]
B. COUPLING
Coupling occurs when electromagnetic energy enters an
electrical system where it can cause damage or destruction to
the sensitive electronic components. Coupling is accomplished
by one of two processes: either the radiated EMP impinges
directly on a system, or the current and voltage pulses
induced by the EMP collect on external conductors and are then
transferred into the system. [Ref 8: p. 10-16] Any energy
collector which allows electrical current to flow through it
is called a conductor. Antennas may be deliberate or
nondeliberate energy collectors. An antenna designed to
transmit and/or receive radio frequencies is an example of a
deliberate collector. The following is a list of the more
common nondeliberate antennas which can also function as
conductors:
Long cables, pipes, and conduits;
Antenna leads, guy wires, and support towers;
Power lines and telephone cables;
Electrical wire and conduit within buildings;
Wire fences and expanded metal lath;
Railroad tracks, aircraft bodies, and ships; and,
Grounding systems and metal buildings.
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The amount of energy collected will depend not only on the
size and shape of the collector, but also on the orientation
of the collector with respect to the source of the EMP. [Ref
5: pp. 520-521] As shown in Figure 7, all conductors act like
antennas which first collect the EMP and then deliver it to
the system [Ref. 6: p. 49]. Long conductors such as power
lines are particularly susceptible to the low frequency
components of the HEMP. For example, an EMP could provide
enough energy to a wire the length of a football field to
light 1,500, 100 watt bulbs, for an instant [Ref. 1: p. 42].
Short conductors are more susceptible to the HEMP's high
frequency components. [Ref 9: p. 3]
It is important to note that equipment does not have to be
physically connected to a conductor for damage to occur. The
energy from the HEMP may be coupled to the equipment through
a process called induction. This is the production of
electrification in a component or circuit through its mere
proximity to the energy source. For example, electrical
equipment placed next to one or more of the above listed
deliberate and nondeliberate antennas during a HEMP could
experience damage. However, and as illustrated in Figure 8,
the usual manner in which energy is coupled into a system is
through one or more of the following: diffusion, leakage,



























Figure 7. All Conductors Act Like Antennas
1. Diffusion
Diffusion occurs when the current passes directly
through the equipment's housing or case. This coupling path
will tend to be insignificant if the housing is a good
conductor of electrical current such as a metal radio shelter.
If the housing is not a good conductor or is some type of
composite material like fiberglass or plastic, then the
diffusion of energy into the equipment may be significant.
24
2. Leakage
Leakage of energy into eguipment usually occurs around
joints, seams, and welds in the eguipment' s housing. The
magnitude of the leakage will depend on the electrical
conductivity across the various points of leakage in the
eguipment case.
3. Apertures
Apertures are openings in the housing such as doors,
windows, and vents through which the current enters the
eguipment. The degree of coupling from this type of entry
will depend on the size of the aperture and its location on
the housing.
4. Penetrations
Penetrations in the eguipment housing for items such
as cable entries, antennas, and access connectors for
ancillary eguipment provide another entry point through which
coupling can occur. As with apertures, the amount of coupling
from penetrations will depend on their size and location on
the housing. Penetrations and apertures that face the source
of the EMP normally experience greater coupling effects than
those facing away from the EMP source.
5. Coupling To Aircraft
Coupling in aircraft is important to the communicator.
Aircraft are freguently reguired to support ground units and







Figure 8. EMP Coupling to Systems
links to accomplish this mission. Also, aircraft may be used
for the aerial retransmission of long distance communications
in areas where other communications means are unavailable or
impractical
.
At the moment of a HEMP, aircraft traveling in free
space would be engulfed by the EMP propagating in the free
space environment. The energy pulses striking the plane would
be partially reflected and scattered. This effect would
result in an electromagnetic field being developed on the
surface of the aircraft. The metal skin of the aircraft would
act like a conductor to reduce the effect of diffusion through
the skin of the plane; however, Figure 9 identifies a few of
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the apertures, leakage areas, and penetrations in the
aircraft's fuselage that would permit some of the energy from
the surface electromagnetic field to couple with the plane's
sensitive interior components [Ref. 6: p. 55]. The
communicator should assume that aircraft communication assets
will be lost in a HEMP environment and plan for alternate
means of communications. [Ref 10: pp. 225-227]
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Figure 9. EMP Coupling to Aircraft
6. Coupling To Ships
Coupling in ships is important to the communicator
because the navy freguently transports ground units to the
objective area and supports their movement ashore during
amphibious operations. Further, the navy supports operations
ashore both logistically and with naval gunfire. All of these
efforts require numerous communications links between ship and
shore. The loss of these vital communications networks due to
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the harmful effects of EMP could prove disastrous to the units
ashore when they are deprived of the necessary support.
Figure 10 shows how some of the EMP's radiated
electromagnetic fields can penetrate surface ships directly
through apertures in the ship's structure such as hatches and
ports [Ref. 6: p. 59]. Additionally, coupling can occur
through penetrations in the ship's hull for antennas, cables,
conduits, and other devices. Because a ship is constructed in
sections, numerous seams, welds, rivets, and bolts are present
which would permit coupling through leakage. Finally, because
the skin of the ship is metal and a good conductor, coupling
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Figure 10. EMP Coupling to Ships
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The communicator, who plans to utilize shipboard
communications assets in a post-HEMP environment, will
probably be disappointed at the results achieved if a serious
effort is not made to protect those assets.
7. Coupling To Ground-Based Systems
Due to the various types of equipment employed in the
ground-based system and the numerous types of equipment
shelters used, the impact that coupling will have on the
system will depend on the impact it has on the specific pieces
of equipment. Significant diffusion is likely to occur in all
equipment which is not housed in a metal container. This will
include radio and test equipment which has a plastic case and
other equipment housed in non-conducting material. Equipment
containers and radio cases made of thin metal can be very
effective in preventing coupling through diffusion. The
drawback is that the container must be continuous and without
openings. This makes operation of the equipment virtually
impossible. [Ref. 12: p. 1-28]
Antennas designed to receive below 100,000,000 Hz (100
MHz) are especially good collectors of EMP. The military very
high frequency (VHF) band operates in the range of 30 to 79.95
MHz, so essentially all portable radios will receive direct
EMP penetration through their integral antennas. A major part
of the ground-based system can be made up of vehicles as
displayed in Figure 11 [Ref. 6: p. 61]. Vehicles, which are
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themselves conductors and that have power and antenna cables
running across their bodies, will either directly or
indirectly induce currents into those cables. The EMP
currents created on a vehicle body or on cable insulation can
induce currents in adjacent conductors. This means that even
shielded cables can have transients induced on their inner
cores. [Ref 13: pp. 37-40] In fact, all of the equipment
utilized within the ground-based system will have apertures,
penetrations, and seams which can permit coupled energy to
interact with internal circuitry. Cabling, antenna leads, and
the power distribution system are only a few of the items
which will act like large effective antennas to collect EMP
currents and deliver them to the equipment. [Ref 6: pp. 39-84]
Communicators must consider all electric equipment and
electronic components when they consider the effects of the
EMP on the system. Power generators, vehicles, computers, and
heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems are only a
few of the numerous pieces of equipment which make up the
total system and whose loss could degrade or destroy the
system's ability to perform its mission.
C. EMP EFFECTS ON ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
Threat level EMP has about one joule per meter squared of
energy; however, about one millionth of this energy level,
approximately one microjoule, delivered to a single junction
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Figure 11. EMP Coupling to Ground Vehicles
it out. [Ref. 14: p. 308] The previous section discussed how
the EMP's energy transients are collected and delivered into
the system. This section will discuss the harmful effects
which those transients can cause to unprotected equipment.
Technological advances in electronic circuitry have led to
a trend in the development of new electronics toward placing
more components into smaller spaces. As a result of this
trend, circuits have become more susceptible to EMP effects.
This high density packing of components reduces the circuit's
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ability to conduct away the heat which results from the EMP's
intense voltages and current flows. [Ref. 15: p. 23] The
unwanted energy transients and resultant heat that interact
with the sensitive components generally results in either
damage or upset to the equipment. Figure 12 illustrates the
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Figure 12 . Results of EMP Interaction with Systems
1. Component Damage
Component damage that results from an EMP may be
easily defined as any component which fails to perform its
intended operation and must be replaced as a direct result of
the EMP. Refer to Figure 13 for an illustration of the
effects that the EMP has on electronics [Ref. 6: p. 65]. As
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the transient energy is collected and passed to the component,
the energy encounters resistance within the component.
Semiconductors can be expected to receive the most damage
because they are not good conductors, and this characteristic
results in strong resistance which will convert the electrical
energy into heat. It is the resultant heat that causes the
component to fail. In the presence of increased heat,
silicon, which is the primary element in semiconductors,
actually loses its resistance capabilities. This results in
local melting as the higher currents produced by the EMP flow
across the semiconductor. As the currents increase, greater
heat is generated and the resistance decreases. Also,
semiconductors are sensitive to very small currents which
makes them particularly susceptible to damage from the large
currents present with an EMP. [Ref. 6: p. 64]
Damage will generally occur where the energy collector
enters the equipment, for example, at the antenna tuner, power
supply, or radio/wire interface [Ref. 9: p. 4]. Active,
rather than passive components, are more susceptible to EMP
damage. Semiconductors are more susceptible than vacuum tubes
or electromechanical devices. Semiconductors will almost
always experience damage rather than upset due to the
relatively short duration and large amplitude of the EMP
transients. [Ref 16: pp. 10-12] The components which are most
susceptible to lower thresholds of EMP damage are those being
used extensively in today's state-of-the-art computers and
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electronics. And of those components which will receive
damage, the damage will usually take one of the following
forms [Ref. 17: pp. 5-6, 5-7]:
a. Dielectric Breakdown
Dielectric breakdown occurs when voltages, ranging
from 30 to 200 volts, are applied to the dielectric for a
period long enough, usually one microsecond, to cause the
layer to fail. A dielectric is a nonconducting layer which
is used as an insulator between two conductors.
b. Thermal Effect
Thermal effect is caused by the dissipation of
energy within a component due to excessive current flow. It
is the major cause of semiconductor junction failure and
resistor burnout.
c. Interconnection Failure
Interconnection failure results when induced
electrical transients cause the component's temperature to
increase to a sufficient level to cause metal surface
connections to melt.
2. Component Upset
Component upset may be described as a temporary change
in the operating characteristics of a circuit or component
which results from the energy transients associated with an
EMP. Again, refer to Figure 13 for an illustration of
component upset. The circuit may return to normal operation
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when the transient is removed, as with the saturation of an
amplifier, or it may require an operator to reset it manually
as with a tripped circuit breaker. The mission of the
equipment may or may not be affected by the upset depending on
its nature and extent. If the component suffers some type of
permanent alteration, but is still able to function although
at a reduced capability, the component is considered degraded.
Degradation may be caused by long term exposure, about one
microsecond, to EMP transients whose amplitude is insufficient











Figure 13. EMP Effects on Electronics
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Although digital systems are more susceptible,
component upset can occur in both analog and digital systems
at as low as a few volts. The EMP can induce stresses into
systems up to several thousands of volts. Generally, the
energy required to cause component upset is a factor of 10 to
100 times lower than that required to cause component damage
[Ref. 8: p. 10-28]. The upset occurs at low system stress
levels when the system sees the EMP as a normal input and
responds accordingly. A problem arises when the system
response is not correct. For example, the system may cause a
circuit to reset a flip/flop switch from on to off or vice
versa. Or, the system's response may cause digital
information to be read incorrectly as in the case of reading
a zero as a one or a one as a zero. [Ref. 6: pp. 72-77]
Because component upset can occur at such low voltage levels,
there exists a potential for extensive system failures.
3. EMP Effects On Electrical Cables
Electrical cables can suffer EMP damage when energy
transients cause the cable voltage to exceed the cable
insulation's threshold or breakdown voltage. The cable's
breakdown strength is limited by the dielectric strength of
small imperfections present in the insulation [Ref. 17: p. 5-
25] . Cables which are already electrically stressed, such as
transmission output cables, will be particularly susceptible
to EMP transients when the difference between the voltage
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supplied by the transmission and the voltage required to
overload the cable is very small. Once the EMP's energy
transients interact with the cable, the cable's insulation
will quickly break down resulting in a cable failure. [Ref. 8:
p. 10-28]
Buried cables offer some protection from the EMP's
energy transients as the ground absorbs the high frequency
portion of the energy. Unfortunately, the ground does not
reflect all of the EMP and a portion of the incident field
will be transmitted into the soil where it can induce current
into the buried cables. Once the current is induced into the
cable, it can be introduced into the system where it can cause
component damage or upset. [Ref. 12: p. 1-27]
D. RADIO BLACKOUT
In addition to the physical damage and upset which the EMP
can cause to communications equipment, it can also seriously
degrade the propagation range for communications. Although
the EMP can adversely impact the frequency range from 3,000 Hz
to 3,000 MHz, it is particularly effective in the high
frequency (HF) band and is sometimes referred to as "HF
blackout." The HF band ranges from 3 to 30 MHz and is used
extensively by the military for long range communications.
This is achieved as the HF signals propagate from the
transmitter to the receiver by successive reflections between
the earth and various atmospheric layers.
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A HEMP will generate an increase in the electron density
of the atmosphere at different heights. This will cause a
significant increase in the atmospheric absorption of some of
the HF signals, and may cause a lowering of the altitude at
which the signal is reflected. HF blackout may last from
several seconds to several hours, and recovery will depend on
the weapoi s yield, height of burst, and the number of times
the signal is reflected through the region of increased
electron density.
Signals in the very high freguency (VHF) range, from 30 to
300 MHz, are used primarily for line-of-sight communications
over short distances. VHF signals will be degraded through
absorption as they pass through the region of increased
electron density. Signal degradation will last on the order
of minutes to tens of minutes.
The ultra high frequency (UHF) band, from 3 00 MHz to 3 GHz
(3 billion hertz), is used for long range line-of-sight
communications. Signals in the UHF range will experience
degradation due to signal absorption in the area of increased
electron density. This effect can be expected to last from
seconds to minutes. [Ref. 5: pp. 461-490]
E . SUMMARY
This purpose of this chapter has been to familiarize the
reader with the way in which the EMP enters or couples with
electrical and communications equipment. It then discussed
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the harmful effects which the EMP has on the sensitive
components which make up the equipment and the communications
systems. Lastly, the chapter described the concept of radio
blackout and how it degrades communications. The next chapter
will discuss the measures that can be taken to minimize the
effects of the EMP.
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IV. HARDENING EQUIPMENT TO THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the concept of equipment
hardening, or protection, as a means of making the equipment
less susceptible to the harmful effects of an electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) . It will include both the requirements for
hardening and the approach to hardening. It will then
describe the various strategies for reducing the equipment's
EMP environment and raising its threshold to EMP damage or
upset.
It is important to remember that equipment which is
protected from lightning or electromagnetic interference (EMI)
is not adequately protected from the EMP. While some
characteristics of the EMP may be similar to lightning, the
high frequency component of an EMP is much greater than that
of lightning. Therefore, additional hardening is required.
EMI protection alone is inadequate because the amplitudes
reached by an EMP are orders of magnitude greater than those
generated by any EMI. [Ref. 13: p. 37]
B. DEFINING HARDENING
Hardening will be defined in terms of the requirements
that have been determined necessary to protect electronic
equipment from an EMP, as well as the approach taken. If the
40
hardening effort is to be effective, it must be continually
evaluated and implemented at all levels within the system from
equipment designer to operator.
1. Requirements
The first part of the definition involves the process
of accurately deciding if specific pieces of electronic
equipment or systems will require EMP hardening, and it must
include the consideration of many factors. Figure 14 displays
the decision process that determines the hardening requirement
[Ref. 6: p. 91]. The final decision of whether or not to
harden will result after careful analysis of the factors to
determine if the equipment meets the hardening requirement.
One of the most important requirements to determine, but
perhaps one of the most difficult, is if the equipment will be
exposed to an EMP [Ref. 6: p. 90]. Certainly, equipment which
will be employed within a combat area can reasonably be
expected to be exposed to an EMP provided the enemy has a
nuclear capability. Equipment which will be used exclusively
within the continental United States is less likely to be
exposed, unless there is a high altitude nuclear detonation
like that described in Chapter II. Because EMP hardening
increases the cost of equipment, it is not possible to harden



























Figure 14. Major Hardening Requirement Decisions
A second important requirement, and one that is
somewhat easier to determine, is whether or not the equipment
performs an essential mission [Ref. 6: p. 90]. It can be
argued that all electronic and communications equipment
related to the employment of strategic nuclear weapons must be
EMP hardened because it performs an essential mission in the
defense of the nation and its forces. However, hardening all
radio equipment down to the squad level may not be viewed as
essential or practical based on the mission performed and the
cost. If the cost of a hardened radio is more than the cost
of buying an additional unhardened radio, then the decision
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not to harden would appear to be acceptable given these
considerations. This may be the case when the equipment
requires an expensive retrofit to achieve hardening.
Equipment must be evaluated with respect to the EMP
environment that it will be required to survive. Chapter III
described both the radiated field and the conducted transient
environments and how they affect electronic equipment. The
type of EMP hardening required will depend on which
environment the equipment will encounter. In determining the
threat environment, it is known that electric and magnetic
fields will be present in the radiated environment, and
currents and voltages will be present in the transients
induced on conductors. It may be necessary to harden the
equipment to one or both of these harmful environments. [Ref.
6: p. 90]
The manner in which equipment is expected to respond
after exposure to an EMP is another requirement that must be
considered for hardening. The equipment's post-exposure
response will depend not only on how long the EMP lasts, but
on its magnitude as well. These factors will help determine
whether the equipment's electronics are upset or damaged. If
the equipment undergoes electrical upset, can there be any
allowable downtime before recovery? If damage occurs, will
loss of the equipment jeopardize the mission? Equipment that
performs the highest level essential missions would require
more hardeninq than equipment performing lower level missions.
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The additional hardening should ensure that the equipment is
not damaged and responds in the desired manner regardless of
the duration and amplitude of the EMP. [Ref. 6: p. 90]
2 . Approach To System Hardening
The approach taken to solve the problem of system or
equipment hardening is the second part of the hardening
definition. Basically, it is centered around the two
approaches that can be taken to achieve hardening. The two
approaches are to reduce the incident EMP environment and/or
increase the equipment's threshold. Both approaches will be
discussed in detail in the following sections.
C. REDUCING THE EMP ENVIRONMENT
This approach to the problem of hardening involves a
determination of whether or not to protect the entire system
or only those components that have the lowest threshold and
are the most susceptible to EMP upset or damage [Ref. 6: p.
94] .
1. Strategy
There are two strategies that can be used to reduce
the EMP environment. The first involves the creation of one
or more zones or barriers of protection around a component or
system. An example of one zone protection would be the EMP
shielding around a single component within a radio. An
example of multiple zones of protection would include the
shielding around a component, enclosed within a protective
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equipment case, and housed within a hardened shelter. Figure
15 illustrates the multilevel barrier approach to system
hardening [Ref. 18: p. 57]. Because conductors attenuate or
lessen the electromagnetic waves, zonal barriers are generally
constructed out of conductive material. The effectiveness of
barriers or zones may be reduced by energy leakage into the
equipment if all the penetrations and apertures required for
power cables and various connections are not treated to
prevent the intrusion of unwanted radiated energy. It must be
remembered that a zone of protection will only be as strong as
its weakest link. [Ref. 6: p. 98]
The second strategy for reducing the EMP environment
is to design the electromagnetic topology of the system in
such a way that all elements of the system are protected.
This approach differs from the first strategy in that it
usually entails connecting systems which are external to the
first system. An example would be connecting one zone to a
second zone via a shielded cable. If the connecting cable is
unshielded, the entire system may be compromised through the
intrusion of transients which can be induced on the metallic
connecting cables. To reduce this threat, transient
suppressors and filters are used at the penetrations to the
protected components and in addition to shielded cables. [Ref.
6: p. 100]
The strategy utilized for the allocation of hardening







Figure 15. Multibarrier EMP Hardening
resources is for the creation of nested zones which are
successively more tightly controlled to protect the internal
electromagnetic environment from the EMP. Of course, this
option increases costs and complicates the design of the
system, but it does reduce the uncertainty of protection which
results from the use of individual barriers. Further,
multiple layers of protection add redundancy to the zones and
make the system more robust. This is important for systems
which perform essential missions. [Ref. 6: p. 102] A second
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option is the use of one zone to protect all of the internal
components. This approach permits the use of off-the-shelf,
unhardened, and less expensive equipment within the barrier.
If the barrier is compromised, all of the equipment contained
within it can be adversely effected by the EMP. [Ref. 18: p.
58]
If hardening is considered when a system is designed
rather than after it is fielded, it will permit more
flexibility in the choice of a hardening technique as well as
reduce costs and result in a less complex design. Simple,
well-designed systems in which electronics are small and
collocated are easier and cheaper to harden. [Ref. 6: p. 105]
2. Shielding
Equipment shields are used to protect sensitive
electronic components from the EMP's harmful effects. Figure
16 illustrates the purpose of a shield [Ref. 18: p. 41]. To
be effective, shields must be composed of conductive material
to ensure hardening against both the electric and magnetic
fields present in the EMP. Shields provide protection when
the EMP's electric field causes charged particles within the
conductive shield to move and rearrange themselves in response
to the radiated field. This rearrangement results in the
particles creating their own electric field which opposes the
EMP's field. The opposing fields are equal in electric charge










Figure 16. Effective Shields Exclude EMP
magnetic fields produce continuous current flows on the
surface of the conductive shields. These current flows are
opposed to the original magnetic field but are not strong
enough to completely cancel the EMP's magnetic field unless
the shields are made from a very good conductor, such as
copper, and are of appreciable thickness. If weight is not a
consideration for shielding, then an alternative to using a
relatively light weight conductor like copper would be to use
a ferromagnetic material such as iron. Ferromagnetic
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materials provide good shielding properties because they have
unbalanced currents flowing within their individual atoms.
These atoms produce small magnets that rearrange themselves in
opposition to the EMP's magnetic field which results in
effective shielding. [Ref. 6: p. 106]
There are several characteristics found in materials
that make good shields. The type of material used in the
construction of the shield will play an important part in
determining its effectiveness. Materials such as copper,
aluminum, and steel are most often used to provide the best
shielding based on their high electrical conductivity [Ref.
18: p. 39]. A shield's thickness will help establish its
effectiveness in neutralizing magnetic fields. Material
thicknesses of .25 millimeters are typically used to ensure
protection from both electric and magnetic fields; however, if
a ferromagnetic metal is used the thickness may be reduced
[Ref. 18: p. 40].
All shields must be properly constructed in order to
be efficient conductors. As discussed in Chapter III, if
seams are not properly joined, stress, vibration, and
corrosion will cause the shield to lose its connectivity.
[Ref. 6: p. 108] Once this occurs, its effectiveness as a
shield will be reduced and energy will be allowed to leak into
the system and cause damage. Seam stress can be countered
through the careful application of bonding or welding as
required to join sections of a shield. The vibration of
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tactical equipment is impossible to eliminate, but it can be
reduced with the use of shock mounts in vehicular and mobile
shelter mounted equipment. The proper and frequent cleaning
of equipment shields can drastically reduce the effects of
corrosion. Further, the use of sealants and compatible
materials that are corrosion resistant will work to prevent a
corrosion problem from developing [Ref. 19: p. 13-49].
3. Apertures
The proper treatment of apertures to reduce the EMP
environment is important because all equipment requires
apertures for access to operational controls and for
maintenance. The approach to shielding will vary depending on
the type of aperture. Access doors and display windows are
considered here because they represent the types of apertures
that are typically found on radio equipment. Access doors
which are frequently opened are generally treated for
hardening with the use of some type of closely spaced and
overlapping metal flange. When the door is closed, the metal
flange comes in contact with the metal door jamb to provide
continuous connectivity and prevent energy leakage into the
equipment. If the door is infrequently used such as a
maintenance door, the best hardening technique to employ is
securing the door with closely spaced screws. If this method
is used, care must be taken to ensure that all of the screws
are tightened to the same torque in order to prevent the door
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from warping which would disrupt connectivity and permit
energy to leak into the system.
Display windows can be effectively shielded by
covering them with a metal screen that has its wires
electronically connected to each other and to the surrounding
shield. This permits electronic and magnetic fields to flow
over the screen to prevent leakage. A stannous oxide coating
can be used in place of a screen if long term exposure to the
screen will become fatiguing or annoying to the operator. The
coating method is usually more expensive than the metal screen
covering. [Ref. 18: p. 53]
4. Penetrations
Hardening penetrations is an integral part of reducing
the EMP environment. Penetrations to equipment enclosures are
made in order to connect the inside components of the
equipment with additional external equipment, or to provide
access to controls. An example of connecting an external
piece of equipment would be a remote antenna connected to a
radio. Although the radio may be EMP hardened, if both the
antenna cable and the cable penetration are not treated,
unwanted energy can leak into the radio. For some
applications, fiber optic cable can be used to replace copper
cable which acts like a conductor to collect EMP energy and
deliver it to the radio's components. Fiber optic cable is
particularly effective at reducing the EMP environment because
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it is not susceptible to induced or radiated transients. [Ref
.
18: p. 47] However, the user must ensure that the fiber optic
cable does not have a metal element which is sometimes added
by the manufacturer to increase tensile strength.
Fiber optics cannot be used for power cables, so power
cables must be shielded. It is best to use double shielding
on cables which may be exposed to an EMP in addition to the
use of transient protection devices (TPD) at both ends of the
cable where it enters the equipment. The TPD should then be
shunted to ground at the equipment case. [Ref. 20: p. 76] The
TPDs, or surge limiting devices, as they are often called are
used to remove or attenuate (lessen) the harmful transients to
an acceptable level. Some surge limiting devices such as
spark gaps use amplitude to distinguish between desired and
undesired signals. Undesired amplitudes can be the result of
currents and voltages that are induced on cables. A spark gap
is constructed of two electrodes that have a gap between them.
When low, acceptable, voltage is passed through the spark gap,
the device maintains an open circuit. If an unacceptably high
voltage enters the gap, an arc forms across the gap and
results in a short circuit. Variable resistors (varistors)
and surge suppression diodes can be used to produce a similar
result. [Ref. 6: p. 122]
To discriminate between desired and undesired signals
based on frequency, filters are generally used. Undesired
frequencies can be the result of transients. Filters are
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designed to pass a band of either high or low frequencies.
Generally, power lines are filtered to pass low frequencies,
and transmission lines are filtered to pass high frequencies.
[Ref. 18: p. 72] Systems that are required to perform
essential missions, and those that cannot be allowed any
downtime are typically outfitted with hybrid protection.
Hybrid protection results from the use of combinations of
TPD's such as spark gaps and filters. [Ref. 21: p. 4-6]
The actual penetrations are treated by sealing them
closed around the cable or connector to maintain connectivity
and prevent leakage. Whenever possible, the number of
penetrations is reduced, and several cables are run through
the same hole. Small, vacant penetrations can be treated by
sealing the hole, or they can be protected by converting them
into conductive tunnels. If the length of the tunnel is at
least three to five times the diameter of the hole, it will
act like a waveguide to strongly attenuate longer wavelength
radiation and efficiently transmit short wavelength
electromagnetic waves up to the cutoff wavelength. The tunnel
method is effective because most of the EMP's energy has a
wavelength of greater than three meters. Because the
conductive tunnel has a much smaller diameter, the harmful EMP
waves are attenuated. [Ref. 6: p. 116] Figure 17 is an
excellent summary of the proper treatment of apertures and
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Figure 17. Effective Equipment Hardening
5. Grounding
Establishing a good single point ground for an
electrical system is an essential part of protecting it from
EMP upset and damage and is vital to reducing the EMP
environment. Proper grounding provides the equipment with an
intentional conductive path to earth where the energy
transients can be harmlessly dissipated. A few important
rules which should be adhered to when constructing a ground
are to never penetrate barrier surfaces with a grounding
conductor, and to never cross a barrier with a ground. [Ref.
12: p. 2-30] The rules of grounding and a sound grounding
























Figure 18. Grounding Topology
D. RAISING SYSTEM THRESHOLD
The second approach to system hardening involves raising
the equipment's upset or damage threshold. The two strategies
that are employed to accomplish this are component
substitution and circuit redesign. Component substitution
requires that the component most susceptible to failure be
identified and replaced with one that has a higher threshold.
Care must be taken to ensure that the equipment's sensitivity
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is not decreased through the substitution. Further,
increasing the threshold by too large a margin could
jeopardize other components within the system.
Circuit redesign is accomplished at the component level
through the use of filters, spark gaps, and diodes. Filters
attenuate undesired frequencies and spark gaps remove or
reduce harmful amplitudes. These devices are used to raise
the equipment's threshold and make it more robust and less
susceptible to an EMP. [Ref. 6: pp. 128-131]
E. SELECTING A HARDENING APPROACH
The approach to hardening will depend not only on the
nature of the system, but also on its stage in the life-cycle.
For a system in the design stage of its life-cycle, hardening
should take the form of internal shielding for components and
collocating electronics to reduce the incident EMP
environment. For systems that are already fielded, hardening
should include some type of retrofit application of circuit
redesign and component substitution to raise the system's
threshold. The system's size, weight restrictions, and
available space in which to include upgrades are important
considerations to hardening in both new and existing systems.
The approach to hardening a new, fixed site communications
shelter should be to emphasize reducing the EMP environment.
This could be accomplished with the use of powerful EMP
reduction methods such as heavy shielding because system
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weight would not be a consideration. The number of apertures
and penetrations should be reduced, and those that remained
could be effectively treated to prevent leakage.
To harden a new aircraft, the manufacturer should not
depend completely on reducing the EMP environment. The number
of required apertures and penetrations would permit some
leakage, and the weight and space limitations would restrict
the amount of shielding. A significant effort should be made
to increase the aircraft's threshold to EMP damage or upset.
The effort to harden a missile should center more on
increasing the missile's threshold to upset or damage and less
on reducing the EMP environment. This should be done because
of weight and space restrictions and the fact that new missile
designs are using low metal content composite materials which
render shielding less effective.
A tactical radio has severe size, weight and available
space limitations. Additionally, many of the new generation
radios are housed in nonmetallic, nonconductive cases. For
these reasons, there should be almost complete reliance on
raising the system's threshold to accomplish hardening. [Ref.
6: p. 94]
In summary, selection of the proper hardening approach
will ensure the following:
• The enclosure is of suitable material and thickness;
• Only necessary apertures and penetrations are present in
the shield;
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• All apertures are sealed or covered with protective
screens or coatings;
• Vacant penetrations are sealed or converted to conductive
tunnels
;
• Electrical connections and cables are shielded and
grounded; and,
• Filters and surge suppressors are installed on all
nongroundable (fiber optic) cables. [Ref. 22: p. 3-28]
F. FIELD PROTECTIVE MEASURES
There are several protective measures that an equipment
operator in the field can initiate to guard electronic
equipment from an EMP. The following actions may be time and
personnel intensive and should be implemented before the
threat of an EMP is received:
Ensure all shelter doors, vents, and access panels are
closed and sealed.
Place all extra equipment in a sealed shelter or shielded
enclosure.
Unroll excess cables that are connected to equipment to
avoid inducing currents.
Bury cables at least one foot in the ground to minimize
energy transients.
Use non-metallic guy lines and antenna supports.
Use single point earth grounds.
The following actions should be initiated as soon as
practicable after a nuclear burst warning is received:
• Disconnect all deliberate and nondeliberate antennas;
• Disconnect all nonmission essential equipment and place it
in a hardened shelter or below ground level
;
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• Discontinue use of commercial power. [Ref. 9: p. 2]
These measures do not offer any protection for equipment which
must continue to operate in an EMP environment. However,
their implementation will help to ensure that equipment is
operational after the EMP and able to perform its mission.
G. SYSTEM TESTING
Once a system is hardened either throuqh initial desiqn or
retrofit, the hardening must be periodically tested to ensure
that it retains the capability to protect the system from the
harmful effects of an EMP. The requirement exists for systems
to have integrated operational EMP testing in order to
maintain a reasonable confidence in the system's ability to
withstand exposure to EMP transients and still perform its
mission. A system's level of EMP protection cannot be
validated by inspection or analysis. Properly designed
systems must be tested in a facility capable of validating
their EMP hardness. Ground mobile systems are generally
tested in a high level free-field simulator. [Ref. 23: p. 20]
Three types of EMP testing are used to evaluate system
hardness. The first type of test is low-level current
mapping. This is used at the beginning of a test program.
With system power turned off, it is exposed to a low-level
current environment. The test determines if the signatures
and magnitudes of internal cables are within specifications.
After corrections are made, the second test conducted is a
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high-level current injection test. For this test, power is
supplied to the system, and it is injected with a high-level
current to determine system effects. If the system passes the
second test, it undergoes the final test which is the high-
level electromagnetic field test. In this test, waveform
simulation or continuous wave signal, or both will be used
depending on the system characteristics to be tested. [Ref. 5:
pp. 527-529]
H. SUMMARY
This chapter described the main considerations of
equipment hardening which are required to protect it from an
EMP. The two main approaches to hardening are reducing the
EMP environment and raising the system's threshold to upset of
damage. The approach undertaken will depend on careful
consideration of several factors and may include elements of
both approaches. The next chapter will assess the benefit of
EMP hardening and its associated costs.
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V. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE HARDENING: COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter described the various strategies and
techniques used to achieve equipment hardening. Hardening is
undertaken to protect electronic equipment from the damage
that can result from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . To
achieve EMP hardening, certain costs must be considered and
met. Figure 19 is a preview of the topics which will be
discussed as this chapter identifies the costs of EMP
hardening [Ref. 18: p. 227]. This chapter will discuss the
benefits of hardening and present items for consideration in
a cost/benefit analysis.
B. ESTIMATING EMP HARDENING COSTS
Once the decision is made to EMP harden an electronic or
communications system, the system designer is faced with a
number of available hardening alternatives from which to
choose. The alternatives range from a basic barrier-level
protection design to complex component selection and
construction materials and techniques. A prime consideration
that the cost-conscious designer must not forget is that the
EMP protection scheme that offers the lowest cost may not
provide the best protection. In fact, the low cost solution
may prove to be the least cost effective in certain EMP
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Figure 19. EMP Hardening Cost Considerations
environments. To select the hardening approach that is most
cost effective, the program sponsor, in conjunction with the
designer, must initiate and maintain a diligent cost awareness
effort as part of the design and development process. Cost
awareness involves estimating and tracking all costs
associated with the hardening effort and understanding what
determines those costs. Once the costs are estimated, the
projections can be used to compare alternative hardening
approaches in an effort to arrive at the most cost effective
solution. [Ref. 18: p. 02-226]
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The process of estimating EMP hardening costs can vary
from the use of a simple percentage of total system cost to a
highly complex algorithm that requires the input of numerous
variables. For example, it is estimated that the cost to EMP
harden a tactical radio to a 95 percent probability of
survival is about two percent of the total cost of the system.
For systems that require a higher probability of survival, the
hardening costs will be significantly higher. However, a
small increase in EMP protection can buy a large margin of
extra confidence in the survivability of the system. [Ref. 14:
pp. 309-310]
If the system is designed to protect against all of the
harmful environments created during a nuclear detonation,
including the EMP, the cost of hardening can range from one to
ten percent of the total system cost for research,
development, testing, and evaluation, and from one to five
percent for unit production. [Ref. 13: p. 49] From these
estimates, it is evident that even using a basic percentage
approach to calculate total system cost for EMP hardening will
add a significant amount to the system's total cost. More
accurate cost estimates, but not necessarily less expensive
ones, should result from the proper use of sophisticated cost
projection models.
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C. TACTICAL SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COSTS
The total cost of a tactical system from its inception to
its retirement is referred to as the life cycle cost (LCC) of
the system. As can be expected, several elements go into the
calculation of a system's LCC. Although the following list is
not all inclusive, it does represent a good example of most of
the LCC factors that are considered for the hardness






Training and personnel; and,
Development and production of support equipment. [Ref. 24:
p. 20]
A brief summary of the cost effect that these factors can have
on an electrical system is provided in the following sections.
1. Identifying the Threat
The costs associated with identifying the threat are
those costs that accrue from determining the type of EMP that
the equipment can reasonably be expected to be exposed to.
The EMP types would include both the radiated electric field
and induced current environments. The earlier in a system's
life cycle that the EMP threat can be identified, the earlier
that countermeasures can be incorporated into the system's
design and the lower the cost of hardening the system.
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EMP hardening measures that are undertaken after a
system is fielded are always more expensive than measures that
were taken when the system was originally designed. To help
identify the threat, examine the particular mission that the
eguipment is to perform, and determine how essential that
performance is to achieving success in the overall mission.
Eguipment which is essential to mission success will generally
cost more to harden as redundancy and additional EMP
protection is designed into critical components and built into
the system. [Ref. 24: pp. 21-22]
2. Testing (Surveillance)
Testing a system's susceptibility to an EMP is a
difficult and expensive process. The cost of testing will
depend on the number of tests to be conducted and the criteria
of testing [Ref. 12: p. 3-17]. New systems are tested to
ensure that they meet EMP hardening specifications, and
fielded systems are tested and inspected to ensure hardness is
maintained and does not deteriorate with age and use. EMP
testing cannot be accomplished with the detonation of actual
nuclear devices, therefore, the Department of Defense has
invested millions of dollars in the development and
construction of EMP simulators. The U.S. Air Force has an EMP
simulator that can test an entire aircraft for the effects of
EMP, and the Navy has a simulator that can evaluate a ship's
susceptibility to the effects of an EMP. Ground-based systems
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are usually tested in a "field" environment after all of the
necessary pre-production EMP testing is completed and before
the system is fielded for use. Testing costs are estimated
early in the system's life cycle and include post-deployment
testing as well. [Ref. 24: p. 22]
3. Research and Development
The research and development effort involved with EMP
hardening can be very costly for new systems and for upgrading
existing systems. If new technology is developed, research
costs alone will account for a significant part of the
system's total LCC. Lower research costs can be realized if
existing "off-the-shelf" technology can be employed. The
majority of research and development costs will result from
efforts to counter the EMP threat previously identified. [Ref.
24: p. 22]
4. Manufacturing and Production
Establishing a manufacturing facility, if necessary,
and tooling-up for full scale production can represent part of
the very expensive start-up costs associated with a new
system. In addition to capital investments, the people who
will be required to operate the production process must be
hired and trained. Low volume production runs and the
unnecessary use of expensive EMP hardened subassemblies and
components which do not contribute to the equipment's overall
protection will increase the per-unit cost of hardened
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systems. A good up-front design effort is important to
minimize manufacturing and production costs. [Ref. 24: pp. 22-
23]
5. Training and Personnel
The costs associated with training personnel will
depend on the number of systems to be fielded and the
complexity of the system design. The training requirement
will include operators, technicians, and support personnel.
Costs can include the development of a training program,
materials, and facilities. [Ref. 24: p. 23] It may be
necessary to hire new personnel, and the cost of this effort
must also be included.
6. Development and Production of Support Equipment
EMP hardened equipment can require the use of special
tools and procedures for its repair and maintenance. Many of
these specialized tools will be developed and manufactured
after production of the system they are designed to support.
If required, this effort can significantly increase the cost
of a hardened system as new production facilities and support
are developed. [Ref. 24: p. 23]
Although most operators do not consider the cost of
the EMP hardened communications equipment that is used to
support military operations, it is important to recognize the
various cost factors that makeup the system's LCC. Once this
is accomplished, an effort can be made to reduce those costs
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at each stage of a system's life cycle. The communicator can
have a significant impact on reducing the repair and
replacement costs of equipment through the proper maintenance,
operation, and employment of tactical systems. Proper
maintenance of equipment will ensure that it sustains its
capability to minimize the harmful effects of an EMP.
Equipment that is operated in accordance with the
manufacturer's specifications for frequency, power output, and
antenna selection will be less susceptible to component damage
or upset from an EMP. The employment of equipment within an
EMP environment that it is not designed to tolerate will
diminish or destroy the equipment's ability to perform its
mission.
D. STATIONARY SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COSTS
All of the cost factors associated with EMP hardening for
tactical systems also apply to stationary systems.
Additionally, there are costs associated with the requirement
for stationary systems to have relatively large, fixed-plant
facilities that require hardening. Initially, there is the
cost of implementing the design to harden the facility and the
cost of materials and labor. Other costs will include all of
the efforts that go into hardening the facility's apertures
and penetrations to protect against EMP leakage, and the cost
of the shielding which surrounds the building to create an
EMP-resistant barrier. The use of filters for power and
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telephone lines and any hardening required to protect the
system's antennas will add significantly to hardening costs
[Ref. 12: pp. 3-10 and 3-11].
Additional costs associated with the facility will include
surveillance costs such as tests, inspections, and evaluations
to ensure that adequate EMP protection is maintained. Costs
that result from the surveillance effort are the cost of
periodic repairs and scheduled maintenance as well as
operations and maintenance costs that can be directly
attributed to the facility's EMP hardening. [Ref. 7: p. 4-31]
Finally, stationary facilities are frequently required to
maintain a stock of EMP hardened replacement equipment which
can result in large inventory costs. [Ref. 25: p. 3-6]
E. LIFE CYCLE COST CONSIDERATIONS
Determining the actual cost that EMP hardening adds to a
system is a difficult and time consuming process. Often, the
actual cost can not be fully calculated until the system is in
operation. Even then, continuing maintenance and surveillance
costs must be added to the system's LCC until the total cost
can be calculated when the system is retired.
Program managers need some mechanism for making a rough
approximation of a system's total LCC for use in financial
planning and budget submissions in the beginning phases of a
system's life cycle. This can be accomplished if the
historical budget data of similar EMP hardening programs is
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used to predict the various LCC considerations that a typical
program will encounter. Using this basis, three major cost
considerations are identified and can be evaluated. [Ref. 25:
p. 3-6]
1. Acquisition Costs
It can be estimated that approximately 28 percent of
the system's total LCC will derive from acquisition costs.
The acquisition costs will be broken down as follows:
• 12% for design;
• 72% for fabrication;
• 14% for installation and evaluation; and,
• 2% for documentation.
2. Operation Costs
Operation costs will account for about 12 percent of
the total LCC. These costs result from the following factors:
• 68% for personnel; and,
• 32% for petroleum, oil, and lubricants.
3. Logistic Support Costs
The largest percentage of LCC can be attributed to
logistic support costs. These costs account for approximately
60 percent of the total cost and include the following:
• 92% for recurring logistic support costs. This includes
roughly 20% for replenishment spares, 10% for repair
materials, and 70% for repair labor costs.
• 8% for support investments. Support investments are
calculated based on an average of 8% for initial training,
25% for age, and 67% for initial spares.
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Of course, the above figures are to be used only for
initial cost estimates. As the EMP hardening program becomes
better established, more accurate LCC estimates can be
achieved. [Ref. 25: p. 3-7]
F. EMP HARDENING BENEFITS
The major benefit that is derived from EMP hardening can
be summed-up in one word, "survivability." EMP hardening
significantly increases the probability that eguipment will
survive an EMP environment and continue to perform its mission
both during and after exposure to an EMP. Having electronic
and communications equipment that is operational in a post-EMP
environment is critical to mission accomplishment and overall
success for the tactical commander on the battlefield.
On a larger scale, the ability of early warning and
defense systems to withstand a HEMP and continue to operate
and respond to commands is essential to national security.
The command and control system of the National Command
Authority is dependent on EMP-survivable electronic and
communications equipment for the control and employment of the
nation's military to include strategic nuclear weapons. EMP
hardening helps to ensure that these systems are available for
use as a deterrent or for defense should it become necessary.
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G. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The cost/benefit analysis is based on the cost of EMP
hardening compared to the benefits which result from having
hardened equipment. There are several approaches that can be
taken when conducting a cost/benefit analysis, and the
approach that is used will be determined by the event being
measured. In this section, two approaches that are applicable
to EMP hardening will be discussed. They are the probability
model ana the cost effectiveness model. It is important to
remember that these models result in very subjective analysis.
This subjectivity results from the answers that are obtained
to difficult questions such as what cost and benefit factors
will be considered, and how will those factors be measured.
Further, the calculations that would be made are based on
items that are difficult to quantify such as intangible
benefits like the number of lives that would be saved and the
feeling of security that would result from EMP hardening.
[Ref. 26: pp. 73-100]
1. Probability Model
In this model for the development of a cost/benefit
analysis, the probability of a system's exposure to an EMP is
calculated. The calculated probability is based on the
likelihood of a nuclear detonation in a particular area. The
area under consideration may be a small battlefield in some
remote corner of the world or the entire United States. The
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resulting probability will depend on the particular scenario
under evaluation, and the likely result will be a range of
probabilities corresponding to the number of scenarios
evaluated. [Ref. 27]
Once the probability of exposure to an EMP is
determined, the cost of protecting equipment from the EMP is
calculated. Typical hardening costs include the following:
• Purchase and installation of shielding to include the
treatment of apertures and penetrations;
• Shielded cables, filters, and EMP hardened components and
subassembl ies
;
• Antenna treatments and special grounding requirements;
• Additional costs associated with circuit design, the EMP
hardening method utilized, and the margin of protection
required; and,
• Other life cycle costs specific to hardening.
It is important to note that the cost considered
involves more than the dollar amount associated with hardening
and all of the cost factors previously discussed. The cost
also includes such things as the ability to pay and the cost
of other goods and services that must be sacrificed to pay for
hardening. For example, if a particular radio system is EMP
hardened, the increased cost due to hardening may drastically
reduce the quantity of radios that can be purchased. And if
reducing the number of radios to be purchased is not an
option, then budget cuts may have to be made in other
acquisition programs in order to divert funds to the radio
purchase. These are some of the difficult decisions that
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program managers and acquisition specialists must make, and
they use the cost/benefit analysis as an aid in the decision
making process.
Measuring the potential benefits of an EMP-hardened
system is not too difficult for the following example. A
combat unit is able to utilize its EMP-hardened radio
equipment during and after exposure to an EMP. Because of
this, the unit completes its mission, and the lives of
countless men are saved. A second benefit, and one that is
more difficult to quantify, is the feeling of security that
results from knowing that the equipment is EMP-hardened, and
that it will continue to operate in an EMP environment.
Once the costs and benefits of hardening are totaled,
they are compared to the probability of exposure to an EMP.
A decision maker then determines if the cost of hardening is
justified when the probability of an EMP and the benefits of
hardening are considered.
2. Cost Effectiveness Model
The cost effectiveness model is more narrowly defined
than the probability model. In this approach, one vital
communications link or system is considered rather than all of
the assets in a particular area. First, the cost of EMP
hardening for a particular system is calculated. The costs
are basically the same as those considered in the probability
model. Next, alternate methods of ensuring that the system
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will be available for use in the event of an EMP are
evaluated. Alternate methods may include non-EMP hardened
redundant systems or the use of EMP resistant transmission
methods and media such as microwave and fiber optic cable.
The decision maker then determines the most cost effective
approach to ensuring that the system remains viable in an EMP
environment. The benefits of maintaining an operational
system will depend on the importance of the system being
evaluated. In general, the benefits are the same as those
considered in the probability model and may even include
increased national security when critical, high level systems
are evaluated. [Ref. 27]
Few people would argue against a reasonable
expenditure for EMP hardening given the benefits that result.
However, the benefit side of the argument does not outweigh
the cost side in every case. The question that arises is
whether or not all electronic and communications equipment
requires hardening. The ideal answer is yes, provided the
cost can be met. In the present economic environment of
fiscal austerity and budget cuts, the real answer is no.
Therefore, the question becomes which pieces of equipment
require hardening and in what numbers. Once this question is
evaluated and answered, a total cost can be estimated. It is
then up to the national leadership to decide if the potential
benefits of EMP hardening exceed the costs.
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H. SUMMARY
This chapter began by presenting an overview of the
methods used to estimate the cost of EMP hardening. It then
identified and described the major cost considerations for EMP
hardening for both tactical and stationary systems. The
chapter also discussed life cycle cost considerations and the
benefits of EMP hardening. The chapter closed with a
description of costs and a discussion of two cost/benefit
analysis models. Chapter VI follows and is the final chapter
of this thesis. It contains a brief summary of recent world
events as they pertain to the material presented in this
thesis and conclusions regarding EMP hardening and training.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
In recent years, we have seen that major events which
impact the entire world tend to occur so rapidly that one can
hardly keep pace. Such is the case as it pertains to this
thesis. When this thesis was begun, the world order was much
as it had been since the conclusion of World War II. The
principal adversary of the United States was the Soviet Union,
and America's defenses were based on the Soviet threat. The
Soviet Union was in some ways a "comfortable" enemy in that
America's military planners knew what they could expect from
them in the way of hostile action both through direct Soviet
action and through their intervention and influence in third
world nations. It was common knowledge that the Soviet Union
had nuclear weapons and a delivery system capable of placing
those weapons in America's heartland. Because of this,
efforts were made to counter the nuclear threat. One result
was development of the World Wide Military Command and Control
System (WWMCCS) . This system is designed to give the national
leadership early warning in the event of a Soviet first
strike. The system is also used to control the nation's
conventional and nuclear defense assets. It is WWMCCS that
would have carried the National Command Authority's order to
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counterattack a Soviet missile launch. However, this
essential system is composed of electronic and communications
components without which the system could not function. If
these components are not hardened, they are susceptible to the
harmful effects of an EMP.
One possible attack scenario was the high altitude
detonation of a sizeable nuclear device about 300 kilometers
above northeast Kansas, as discussed in Chapter II. The
resulting HEMP from this type of detonation would affect the
entire continental United States. As discussed in Chapter
III, unprotected electronic and communications equipment would
experience component upset or damage, and it was postulated
that America's defense system would be rendered useless. The
Soviet army would then march in and "bury us" as Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev had predicted in the early 1960 's.
While this scenario may seem unrealistic, consider a plan that
was rumored to have been evaluated by the U.S. military during
the recent Gulf War. In it, a nuclear device would be
detonated at a suitable altitude over Iraq for the purpose of
generating a HEMP that would cripple Iraq's command and
control system and power distribution network. If the plan
was legitimate, it was never executed. One reason may have
been because Iraq made extensive use of fiber optic cable
which is not affected by the EMP. In any case, the HEMP
threat that existed when this thesis was begun has now been
greatly reduced by the demise of the Soviet Union.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
Because this nation's command and control systems, such as
WWMCCS, are so dependent on electronic equipment, they are
susceptible to EMP damage and/or upset if they are not EMP
hardened. Efforts that were made to protect mission essential
equipment should not be abandoned. But with the collapse of
the Soviet Union, some would argue that the nuclear threat
that the United States has been exposed to for the last forty
years has been severely reduced if not eliminated, and a HEMP
is no longer a threat. This may be true concerning the large,
long range nuclear weapons because other nations do not
currently possess the necessary delivery vehicles. However,
nuclear weapons and their resulting EMP are still a threat.
In addition to several nations attempting to develop a nuclear
capability, there is the growing threat of exposure to an EMP
from the detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon that is
obtained by a radical third world country like Libya or Iraq.
And there is always the possibility of some fanatical
terrorist group obtaining one or more low yield nuclear
devices and detonating them for the purpose of disrupting
America's defense network. It is for these reasons that, at
a minimum, mission essential electronic and communications
equipment must continue to be protected against an EMP. The
EMP threat has been reduced, but not totally eliminated.
Military personnel who work in the field, and particularly
those who operate, maintain, and employ electronic and
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communications equipment, should be made aware of what the
electromagnetic pulse is and the actions they can initiate to
protect their equipment from an EMP.
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